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Taking into account the fact that overload failures in real-world functional networks are usually
caused by extreme values of temporally fluctuating loads that exceed the allowable range, we study
the robustness of scale-free networks against cascading overload failures induced by fluctuating loads.
In our model, loads are described by random walkers moving on a network and a node fails when
the number of walkers on the node is beyond the node capacity. Our results obtained by using
the generating function method shows that scale-free networks are more robust against cascading
overload failures than Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs with homogeneous degree distributions. This
conclusion is contrary to that predicted by previous works which neglect the effect of fluctuations
of loads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern human societies are supported by various func-
tional networks, such as power grids, the Internet, road
systems, and corporate transaction networks [1, 2]. Since
the function of a network is guaranteed by its global
connectivity, a decomposition of the network into dis-
connected components by failures on network elements
(nodes or links) might induce the breakdown of the func-
tion, which causes a fatal damage to our daily life. It is
thus crucial to elucidate what type of network topology
is resilient to failures. In this context, the vulnerability of
complex networks against random failures and targeted
attacks has been extensively studied [3–8]. In these stud-
ies, failed nodes are removed from a network at the same
time. In addition to such simultaneous failures, many
of actual breakdowns are driven by a chain of failures
triggered by initial failures of a single or a few nodes.
Initial failures and subsequent avalanche of failures in
functional networks are often induced by loads exceeding
node capacities. For instance, a bankruptcy of an insol-
vent company and subsequent chain bankruptcies due to
redistributed debts of the bankrupt company can be re-
garded as a process of such cascading overload failures in
a corporate transaction network.
In order to describe how networks lose their global con-
nectivity by cascading overload failures, Motter and Lai
proposed a model in which the load at a node is given by
the betweenness centrality of the node [9]. Their model
predicts that the initial removal of the highest degree (or
highest load) node leads a large scale cascade and scale-
free networks are more fragile against cascading overload
failures than homogeneous networks. The vulnerability
of scale-free networks has also been found in other models
of cascading failures [10–15]. In these models, overload
failures are caused by non-fluctuating loads determined
uniquely by the network structure that exceed the ca-
pacity of each node. It is, however, quite general that
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the load on a node fluctuates temporally [16–18]. An
overload failure takes place when an instantaneous value
of fluctuating load exceeds the capacity, as in the cases
of river flooding or financial collapse in a country [19].
The property of cascading overload failures induced by
extreme events might be largely different from that by
non-fluctuating loads.
However, the robustness of networks against cascading
failures induced by fluctuating loads has not been widely
argued so far [20]. Among several ways to describe fluctu-
ating loads, Kishore et al.modeled them by randomwalk-
ers on a network [21, 22]. They calculated the overload
probability that the number of random walkers on a node
exceeds the predetermined node capacity. Moreover, ap-
plying this theory, the network robustness against non-
cascading overload failures has been studied, in which
nodes are simultaneously removed once according to the
overload probability [23, 24]. Although these theories
take into account the temporal fluctuations of loads, cas-
cade processes triggered by the initial overload failures
have not been considered. In this paper, we examine the
robustness of complex networks against cascading over-
load failures induced by the extreme value of fluctuating
loads. Adopting the random walker model proposed by
Kishore et al. and their theory of the overload probability
[21, 22], we present a simple model to describe cascades
of overload failures caused by fluctuating loads and cal-
culate the size of the giant component after completing
the cascade by using the generating function formalism.
Our main result shows that scale-free networks are more
robust against cascading overload failures than homoge-
neous networks, which is contrary to that predicted by
previous works [9–15].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we present a model to describe cascading overload fail-
ures on a complex network based on the random walker
model proposed by Kishore et al. [21, 22]. In Sec. III,
we explain the method to calculate the size of the giant
component after completing the cascade process by uti-
lizing the master equation for the probability of a node
to have the initial degree k0 and the degree k at a cas-
cade step τ and the generating function formalism. Our
results are presented in Sec. IV. Section V is devoted to
2the summary and concluding remarks.
II. MODEL
In a functional network, some sort of “flow” is often
required to realize its functionality, and at the same time
the flow plays a role of a “load” in the network, such as
electric current in a power grid or packet transfer on the
Internet. The relation between the average and fluctua-
tion of flow in such networks has been investigated empir-
ically and theoretically [16–18]. These studies elucidated
that the flux fluctuations at a node have the same scaling
behavior with the fluctuations of the number of random
walkers on the node. Inspired by this fact, Kishore et
al. modeled fluctuating loads by random walkers moving
on a network [21, 22], where the number of walkers in-
dicates the amount of loads. The stationary probability
to find a random walker on a node of degree k in a con-
nected and undirected network with M0 links is given by
[25]
pk =
k
2M0
. (1)
Using this relation, the probability hk(w) that w walkers
are observed on a node of degree k is presented by
hk(w) =
(
W0
w
)
pwk (1− pk)
W0−w, (2)
where W0 is the total number of walkers in the network.
This leads a natural definition of the node capacity qk of
a node of degree k as
qk = 〈w〉k +mσk, (3)
where 〈w〉k and σk are the average and the standard devi-
ation of the binomial distribution hk(w), which are given
by 〈w〉k = W0pk and σk =
√
W0pk(1 − pk), respectively,
and m is a real positive parameter which characterizes
the node tolerance to load. Since the overload probabil-
ity FW0(k) of a node of degree k is the probability of w
to exceed qk, FW0(k) is given by summing up the distri-
bution function Eq. (2) over w larger than qk. Thus, we
have [21]
FW0 (k) =
W0∑
w=⌊qk⌋+1
(
W0
w
)
pwk (1 − pk)
W0−w
= Ik/2M0 (⌊qk⌋+ 1,W0 − ⌊qk⌋), (4)
where Ip(a, b) is the regularized incomplete beta function
[26] and ⌊x⌋ is the greatest integer not greater than x. It
is important to pay attention to the fact that the overload
probability is a decreasing function of degree k [21].
Based on the above overload probability, we model the
cascade process of overload failures as follows:
(i) Prepare an initial connected, uncorrelated, and
undirected network G0 with N0 nodes and M0 links, in
which W0 random walkers exist, and determine the ca-
pacity qk of each node according to Eq. (3).
(ii) At each time step τ , assign Wτ random walkers to
the network Gτ at time τ . The total load Wτ is given by
Wτ =
(
Mτ
M0
)r
W0, (5)
where Mτ is the total number of links in the network Gτ
and r is a real positive parameter.
(iii) Calculate the overload probability of every node,
and remove nodes from Gτ with this probability.
(iv) Repeat (ii) and (iii) until no node is removed in
the procedure (iii).
In the procedure (ii), the total loadWτ is reduced in ac-
cordance with the reduction of the network size. In actual
cases of cascading failures, the total load is often reduced
to some extent during a cascade process to prevent the
breakdown of the network function. For instance, when
a problem arises in a power supply system due to a natu-
ral disaster, the temporary restriction of electricity use is
sometimes introduced to avoid a large-scale breakdown of
the power grid, as in the case of the Tohoku earthquake
and tsunami in 2011 [27]. In addition, when a company
goes bankrupt, a large-scale chain bankruptcy could be
prevented by the reduction of the total debt (loads) on
the transaction network by means of, for example, a spe-
cial low-interest lending facilities for companies having
business relationships with the bankrupt company or the
injection of taxpayers’ money. The quantity Wτ given
by Eq. (5) represents such a reduction of the total load
during the cascade process. The exponent r character-
izes how quickly the total load decreases with decreasing
the network size, which we call hereafter the load re-
duction parameter. Although the initial network G0 is
connected, the network Gτ at cascade step τ is not nec-
essarily connected. For an unconnected network Gτ , we
assume that Wτ random walkers are distributed to com-
ponents in proportion to the numbers of links in these
components. Namely, the load allocated to the α-th com-
ponent is given by
Wατ =
Mατ
Mτ
Wτ , (6)
where Mατ is the number of links in the α-th component.
In the procedure (iii), the overload probability dur-
ing the cascade process cannot be calculated straightfor-
wardly by Eq. (4). First, the degree k of a node in the
network Gτ at step τ is not the same as its initial degree
k0. Since the probability to find a random walker on a
node in Gτ is a function of the present degree k of the
node while the node capacity is determined by its initial
degree k0, the overload probability is presented by Eq. (4)
with replacing qk by qk0 . Moreover, when the network Gτ
is unconnected, the overload probability must be calcu-
lated in each component, because random walkers in a
component cannot move beyond the component. There-
fore, the overload probability of a node of degree k, whose
3initial degree is k0, in the α-th component is given by
FWατ (k0, k) = Ik/2Mατ (⌊qk0(W0)⌋+ 1,W
α
τ − ⌊qk0(W0)⌋) ,
(7)
where Mατ and W
α
τ are again the total number of links
and the number of random walkers in the α-th component
of Gτ , respectively.
The robustness of a network against cascading overload
failures described above is evaluated by the relative size of
the giant component Sf ≡ Nf/N0, whereNf is the number
of nodes in the largest component of the network Gf at
the final stage of the cascade process. More specifically,
the robustness of the network is measured by the load
reduction parameter rc above which the relative size Sf
becomes finite. A network providing a smaller rc can
be regarded to be more robust in the sense that there
exists a giant component even if the total load is slowly
reduced in accordance with the reduction of the network
size during the cascade process.
III. SIZE OF THE GIANT COMPONENT
In order to assess the robustness of a network, we cal-
culate the relative size Sτ of the giant component in the
network Gτ at cascade step τ . The calculation of Sτ
requires information on the load Wατ to obtain the over-
load probability FWατ (k0, k) for each component. It is,
however, difficult to find an analytical expression of Wατ .
Thus, we assume that random walkers can jump to other
components with a small probability, which enables us to
estimate the stationary probability to find a walker on a
node of degree k by
pk =
k
2Mτ
, (8)
instead of pαk = k/2M
α
τ , and the overload probability by
FWτ (k0, k) = Ik/2Mτ (⌊qk0(W0)⌋+ 1,Wτ − ⌊qk0(W0)⌋) ,
(9)
instead of Eq. (7). This simplification does not largely
change the overload probability if the number of links in
a component is large enough. The reason is the following.
The probability that w walkers are found on a degree-k
node in the α-th component containing Wατ walkers is
written as
h(w;Wατ , p
α
k ) =
(
Wατ
w
)
(pαk )
w
(1− pαk )
Wατ −w , (10)
if random walkers are confined in the component. The
average and the standard deviation of this binomial dis-
tribution function of w are 〈w〉k = W
α
τ p
α
k = Wτk/2Mτ
and σk =
√
〈w〉k(1− k/2Mατ ), respectively, where we
used Eq. (6) and the relation pαk = k/2M
α
τ . In the case
that random walkers are allowed to jump between com-
ponents, on the other hand, the probability to find w
walkers on a degree-k node is given by h(w;Wτ , pk). The
average 〈w〉′k of this distribution function coincides with
the average 〈w〉k of h(w;W
α
τ , p
α
k ). Although the stan-
dard deviation σ′k =
√
〈w〉k(1 − k/2Mτ) of h(w;Wτ , pk)
is larger than σk of h(w;W
α
τ , p
α
k ), σ
′
k is not very different
from σk ifM
α
τ (thusMτ ) is large enough. Therefore, both
distribution functions h(w;Wατ , p
α
k ) and h(w;Wτ , pk)
with the same average and similar widths are close to
each other. Because of this similarity, FWατ (k0, k) =∑
w≥⌊qk0 ⌋+1
h(w;Wατ , p
α
k ) that leads Eq. (7) can be ap-
proximated by FWτ (k0, k) =
∑
w≥⌊qk0⌋+1
h(w;Wτ , pk)
giving Eq. (9).
We calculate the relative size Sτ of the giant compo-
nent by using the generating function method [28]. To
this end, here we slightly modify the rule of the procedure
(ii) described in Sec. II so that overloaded nodes are not
removed but left in the system as zero-degree nodes for
which random walkers never visit. This does not influ-
ence any results in this work, except that the total num-
ber of nodes in Gτ remains constant at N0, which makes
the theoretical treatment easier. In spite of this modi-
fication, we will continue to use the expression “remove
a node” for simplicity, but this actually means “remove
all links from a node”. The generating function method
then enables us to calculate Sτ if the network Gτ is un-
correlated and the degree distribution function Pτ (k) of
Gτ is given. In order to estimate Pτ (k), we introduce the
probability Πτ (k0, k) that a randomly chosen node has
the degree k and the initial degree k0. Obviously, the
probability Πτ (k0, k) is related to the degree distribution
Pτ (k) through
Pτ (k) =
∑
k0≥k
Πτ (k0, k). (11)
As a special case, we have, at τ = 0,
Π0(k0, k) = P0(k)δk0k, (12)
because k is always equal to k0 in the initial network
G0. To obtain the probability Πτ (k0, k), we further in-
troduce the probability φτ (k) that the overload failure
occurs on a node connected to a node of degree k in the
network Gτ . Considering that Πτ (k0, k)/Pτ (k) represents
the probability of a degree-k node chosen randomly from
Gτ to have the initial degree k0, the probability φτ (k) is
expressed as
φτ (k) =
∑
k0
k0∑
k′=1
Pτ (k
′|k)
Πτ (k0, k
′)
Pτ (k′)
FWτ (k0, k
′), (13)
where Pτ (k
′|k) is the conditional probability that a node
of degree k is connected to a node of degree k′. Since
the network G0 has no degree correlations, Gτ generated
by removing nodes randomly from G0 with a probabil-
ity depending only on the degree is also uncorrelated
[29]. Therefore, the conditional probability is presented
by Pτ (k
′|k) = k′Pτ (k
′)/〈k〉τ , where 〈k〉τ is the average
4degree of Gτ , and φτ is written as
φτ =
∑
k0
k0∑
k′=1
k′Πτ (k0, k
′)
〈k〉τ
FWτ (k0, k
′), (14)
which is independent of k. The probability Πτ (k0, k) is
equal to the probability that a randomly chosen node
from Gτ−1 has the initial degree k0 and the degree of
this node becomes k during the cascade from Gτ−1 to Gτ .
Thus, we can set up the master equation for Πτ (k0, k) as
Πτ (k0, k) =
∑
k′≥k
Πτ−1(k0, k
′)
{(
k′
k
)
φk
′−k
τ−1 (1 − φτ−1)
k[1− FWτ−1(k0, k
′)] + δk0FWτ−1(k0, k
′)
}
. (15)
The right-hand side of this equation represents the prob-
ability that a degree-k′ node in Gτ−1 becomes a node of
degree k. The first term describes the situation that the
degree-k′ node survives and k′−k nodes adjacent to this
node are removed by overload failures. The second term
stands for the case that the degree-k′ node itself experi-
ences an overload failure and becomes a zero-degree node.
Solving numerically Eq. (15) with the aid of Eq. (14),
we can obtain the time evolution of the the probability
Πτ (k0, k) and the degree distribution Pτ (k) by Eq. (11).
The relative size Sτ of the giant component at cascade
step τ is calculated by [28]
Sτ = 1−
∑
k
Pτ (k)u
k, (16)
where u is the smallest non-negative solution of the tran-
scendental equation,
u = G
(τ)
1 (u), (17)
and G
(τ)
1 (x) is the generating function of the remaining
degree distribution, which is defined by
G
(τ)
1 (x) =
1
〈k〉τ
∑
k
(k + 1)Pτ (k + 1)x
k. (18)
According to the procedure (iv) stated in Sec. II, the
cascade process must be terminated when no node ex-
periences overload failures. In an actual calculation, we
stop the cascade process at the step τ satisfying the con-
dition ∑
k,k0
FWτ (k0, k)Πτ (k0, k) <
1
N0
. (19)
This condition implies that the expectation number of
overloaded nodes becomes less than unity.
It should be noted that the above formalism is based
on the approximation that random walkers are allowed to
jump over components with a small probability. In order
to evaluate the accuracy of this approximation, we com-
pare the time evolutions of Sτ for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
graph calculated by both the method explained in this
FIG. 1. (Color online) Relative size Sτ of the giant com-
ponent as a function of the cascade step τ . The initial net-
work is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with 5, 000 nodes and
12, 500 links, which implies that the initial average degree is
〈k〉0 = 5.0. The symbols indicate the results obtained by nu-
merical simulations following the cascade process from (i) to
(iv) described in Sec. II and averaging over 50 network real-
izations. Error bars represent one standard deviation from
the mean values. The lines show the results calculated by the
analytical method explained in Sec. III. The total number of
walkers at the initial cascade step is W0 = 25, 000. The val-
ues of the node tolerance parameter m and the load reduction
parameter r are displayed in the figure.
Section and numerical simulations following the cascade
process from (i) to (iv) described in Sec. II. The results
shown in Fig. 1 indicate that Sτ calculated by Eq. (16)
agrees quite well with the simulation result, which reflects
the high accuracy of the approximation.
IV. RESULTS
We assess the robustness of networks against cascad-
ing overload failures by computing the relative size Sf
of the giant component at the final stage of the cascade
5FIG. 2. (Color online) Relative size Sf of the giant compo-
nent at the final stage of the cascade process as a function
of the load reduction parameter r, for an ER random graph
(black dashed line and filled squares) and an SF network (red
solid line and filled circles). The SF network has the degree
distribution given by Eq. (20) with γ = 2.5. The lines repre-
sent the results calculated by the analytical method explained
in Sec. III. The symbols indicate the simulation results ob-
tained by following numerically the cascade process from (i)
to (iv) described in Sec. II and averaging over 50 samples.
Only error bars larger than the symbol size are shown. In
this calculation, we set N0 = 10
4, M0 = 2 × 10
4, m = 2.0,
and W0 = 2M0.
process as a function of the load reduction parameter r.
In this work, we examined two types of initial networks,
namely, homogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs
and scale-free (SF) networks with inhomogeneous degree
distributions. An SF network is generated by the con-
figuration model [30] with the degree distribution given
by
P0(k) =


C
kγ + dγ
for k ≥ kmin,
0 for k < kmin,
(20)
where d is a real positive parameter and γ is the exponent
describing the asymptotic power-law form of the degree
distribution, i.e., P0(k) ∝ k
−γ for k ≫ d. In Eq. (20),
kmin is the minimum degree, and C is the normalization
constant. The parameters d and kmin can control the av-
erage degree 〈k〉0 for a fixed value of γ. Throughout this
paper the minimum degree is fixed at kmin = 2. Figure
2 shows the r dependence of Sf for an ER random graph
(black dashed line and filled squares) and for an SF net-
work (red solid line and filled circles). Both networks
have N0 = 10
4 nodes and M0 = 2 × 10
4 links, which
implies that the initial average degree is 〈k〉0 = 4.0. The
initial total load is chosen as W0 = 2M0 and the node
capacity qk is determined by Eq. (3) with m = 2.0. For
the SF network, the exponent γ is set as γ = 2.5 and d
FIG. 3. (Color online) Scaling plot of Sf(r,N0) for ER ran-
dom graphs of several sizes (N0 = 2
17, 218, 219, and 220). The
average degree of these networks is set to be 〈k〉0 = 4.0. The
calculations have been done under the condition of W0 =
N0〈k〉0 and m = 2.0. In this plot, we choose rc = 1.84,
β = 1.27, and 1/ν∗r = 19.45. Two branches correspond to the
percolating and non-percolating phases.
is tuned to satisfy 〈k〉0 = 4.0. The solid and dashed lines
in Fig. 2 indicate the results calculated by the analytical
method explained in Sec. III, whereas the symbols rep-
resent Sf obtained by simulating numerically the cascade
process from (i) to (iv) described in Sec. II. For both
types of networks, the analytical results agree quite well
with the numerical ones. As shown in Fig. 2, there ex-
ists a value rc(N0) below which Sf = 0 and above which
Sf > 0. This implies that a global cascade of overload
failures occurs if the total load Wτ is reduced during the
cascade more slowly than the reduction scheme Eq. (5)
with r = rc(N0) while a finite fraction of nodes survives
the cascade if the reduction of Wτ is faster. The fact
that the value of rc(N0) for the SF network is smaller
than that for the ER random graph suggests that SF
networks are more robust to cascading overload failures
than ER random graphs. This tendency is opposite to
what was predicted by previous works [9–15].
The above conclusion is, however, obtained for finite-
size networks. It is crucial to study the robustness of
infinitely large SF networks against cascading overload
failures. If the change of Sf at r = rc(N0) provides a crit-
ical transition when N0 goes to infinity, we can use the
finite-size scaling analysis to calculate rc in the thermo-
dynamic limit. According to the finite-size scaling theory,
the relative size of the giant component in the network
Gf at the final stage of the cascade process starting from
the initial network G0 of size N0 is expressed as
Sf(r,N0) = N
−β/ν∗
0 Φ
(
N
1/ν∗
0 |r − rc|
)
, (21)
where the correlation volume exponent ν∗ characterizes
the divergence of the number of nodes Nξ within the
6FIG. 4. (Color online) NB(lB) for the giant components in
Gf’s obtained numerically by simulating the cascade process
with r = rc(N0) starting from an ER random graph (black
filled squares) and an SF network with γ = 3.5 (red filled
circles). The number of nodes and the average degree of both
of the initial networks are N0 = 10
4 and 〈k〉0 = 4.0, respec-
tively. The calculations have been done under the condition
of W0 = N0〈k〉0 and m = 2.0. The results are averaged over
100 samples. The longitudinal axis is rescaled by NB(lB) at
lB = 1. The dashed lines are merely guides to the eye.
correlation volume as Nξ ∝ |r − rc|
−ν∗ in the infinite
system, β is the critical exponent for the approach to zero
of Sf(r,∞), rc is the critical load reduction parameter in
the thermodynamic limit, and Φ(x) is a scaling function.
Therefore, if the suitable values of the parameters ν∗,
β, and rc are selected, the quantity N
β/ν∗
0 Sf(r,N0) as a
function of N
1/ν∗
0 |r− rc| collapses onto a single curve for
various values of r and N0. Figure 3 shows such a plot
for ER random graphs of different sizes with the use of
the r dependence of Sf(r,N0) calculated by the method
explained in Sec. III and the best-fit values of ν∗, β, and
rc. The fact that all data collapse onto a single curve
implies that the transition at r = rc can be considered
as a critical phenomenon. Similar scaling behaviors have
been confirmed for SF networks.
The criticality of the network Gf at r = rc has also been
confirmed by the fractal property of the giant component
in Gf. The fractality of complex networks is widely in-
vestigated by the box covering algorithm [31–37]. If the
minimum number NB(lB) of subgraphs of radius lB re-
quired to cover a given connected network satisfies the
relation
NB(lB) ∝ l
−dB
B , (22)
the network is considered to be fractal with the fractal
dimension dB [31]. We calculated, by using the compact-
box-burning algorithm [38], NB(lB) for giant components
FIG. 5. Critical load reduction parameter rc as a function of
the exponent γ in the thermodynamic limit. In this calcula-
tion for SF networks, we tune the parameter d in Eq. (20) to
satisfy 〈k〉0 = 4.0 for various values of γ. The values of rc are
estimated through the finite-size scaling analysis for Sf(r,N0)
calculated by the method described in Sec. III under the con-
dition of W0 = 〈k〉0N0 and m = 2.0. The horizontal dashed
line is the result for the ER random graph (γ → ∞) with
〈k〉0 = 4.0.
included in networks Gf at the final stage of the cascade
process with r = rc(N0) starting from both an ER ran-
dom graph and SF network. The giant components are
obtained numerically by simulating the cascade process
described in Sec. II. The results shown in Fig. 4 indi-
cate that the structures of these giant components ex-
hibit the fractal nature, which supports the criticality of
Gf at r = rc. The fractal dimension for the ER random
graph is dB = 1.54 ± 0.01, while dB = 2.13 ± 0.02 for
the SF network with γ = 3.5. These values of dB are
different from those of giant components at the critical
point of the conventional percolation with random node
removals, which are dB = 2 for ER random graphs (or
SF networks with γ ≥ 4) and dB = (γ − 2)/(γ − 3) for
SF networks with 3 < γ < 4 [39]. Such a discrepancy is,
of course, due to the difference in ways of node removals.
In the cascade process, nodes that will be removed at
the cascade step τ depends strongly on nodes removed
at τ − 1, as in the case of a fire spread for which a por-
tion remaining unburned has a different structure from
that of a survival from random removals.
The critical load reduction parameter rc calculated by
the finite-size scaling method is plotted in Fig. 5 as a
function of the exponent γ of SF networks. In this fig-
ure, rc for the ER random graph is also indicated by the
horizontal dashed line. The results only for γ ≥ 5 are
presented here, because for a small value of γ the com-
putation of Πτ (k0, k) requires a long CPU time due to
the increase of the maximum degree kmax of the initial
network G0 associated with a decrease of γ as is given by
7kmax ∝ N
1/γ
0 . We see from Fig. 5 that rc is an increasing
function of γ. This implies that the enhancement of the
SF property by decreasing γ makes networks robust to
cascading overload failures even in the thermodynamic
limit. It should be emphasized that rc is always posi-
tive for any γ. This is because in any network a cas-
cade of overload failures under r = 0 never stops until
the network collapses completely. Our result contrary to
previous predictions [9–15] comes from the fact that the
overload probability is a decreasing function of degree
k. At the first step of the cascade process, nodes with
small degrees are more likely to be removed according
to the overload probability FW0(k). A low-degree node
tends to be connected to a node with large degree in
an uncorrelated SF network. The overload probability
of a high-degree node adjacent to the low-degree node
which was removed at the first step becomes smaller at
the second cascade step than its initial overload proba-
bility. Therefore, nodes with relatively small degrees are
again preferentially removed also at the second step, and
so on. It is obvious that SF networks are robust against
preferential removals of low-degree nodes [40].
Our model differs from previous models of cascading
overload failures in two points. One is that overload fail-
ures in our model occur when fluctuating loads exceed
the capacities predetermined for nodes, while failures are
caused by non-fluctuating loads (or average values of fluc-
tuating loads) exceeding the node capacities in previous
models [9–15]. The other difference is in the dynamics of
loads on a network. In many of previous works [9–15], the
load is defined by flow passing through the shortest path
between a pair of nodes. This type of loads describes, for
example, a packet flow in the Internet and a traffic flow
in a road system. On the other hand, loads in our model
move randomly on a network, as in the case of a flow
of debt in a corporate transaction network. It is impor-
tant to clarify whether the robustness of SF networks is
caused by the fluctuation of load or by its random walk
behavior.
In order to identify the origin of the robustness,
namely, the origin of FW0(k) being a decreasing function
of degree k, we calculate the overload probability for fluc-
tuating loads imposed by a shortest-path flow. Fluctu-
ating loads carried by flow along the shortest paths have
been argued in Ref. [16] to explain the relation between
the average flux and the fluctuations. According to this
work, we newly define the load wi of the node i by
wi =
∑
(j,j′)∈Vu
(j 6=j′)
σjj′ (i)
σjj′
, (23)
where Vu is a set of u node pairs that are randomly se-
lected from (N0−1)(N0−2)/2 node pairs in G0 excluding
the node i, σjj′ is the total number of shortest paths be-
tween the pair (j, j′) in Vu, and σjj′ (i) is the number of
those paths that pass through i. Since the quantity rep-
resented by the right-hand side of Eq. (23) is equivalent
to the betweenness centrality bi if Vu is chosen as the set
FIG. 6. Degree dependence of the overload probability Fu(k)
for several values of the node tolerance parameter m. The
lines from top to bottom represent the results for m = 2.0,
3.0, 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0, respectively. The size of the set Vu
is fixed at u = 500. The load distribution h˜k(w) required
to calculate Fu(k) is numerically evaluated by computing the
partial betweenness centrality for each of 104 different sets Vu
selected from each of 30 SF networks with 104 nodes. The
degree distribution of these SF networks is given by Eq. (20)
with γ = 2.5 and d = 0.152 providing 〈k〉 = 4.0.
of all node pairs, namely, u = (N0 − 1)(N0 − 2)/2, we
call the above quantity wi the partial betweenness cen-
trality. The partial betweenness centrality of a node de-
pends on which node pairs are selected for the set Vu,
and thus the load wi fluctuates in accordance with the
choice of Vu. For a large number of different sets Vu with
1≪ u≪ (N0−1)(N0−2)/2, the distribution h˜i(w) of the
load can be calculated for each node. As the conventional
betweenness centrality bi is strongly correlated to the de-
gree ki in an uncorrelated network [41, 42], the partial
betweenness centrality of a node is also expected to have
a correlation with the degree of the node. In fact, we
have confirmed numerically that two distribution func-
tions h˜i(w) and h˜j(w) of load on the nodes i and j which
have the same degree are close to each other. There-
fore, we can define the degree-dependent load distribu-
tion h˜k(w) for the partial betweenness centrality model,
which corresponds to the load distribution hk(w) given
by Eq. (2) for the random walker model. The node capac-
ity qk is also defined by Eq. (3) with the average load 〈w〉k
and the standard deviation σk calculated by the distribu-
tion function h˜k(w). Finally, as in the case of the random
walker model, the overload probability is defined as the
probability that the load of a node of degree k exceeds its
capacity qk, which is calculated by
∫∞
qk
h˜k(w) dw. Since
h˜k(w) depends on u, we denote this overload probability
by Fu(k) instead of FW0(k).
Figure 6 shows the degree dependence of Fu(k) for sev-
eral values of the node tolerance parameter m. We see
8TABLE I. Robustness/fragility of SF networks against cas-
cading overload failures induced by several types of loads.
The fragility for shortest path flow without fluctuation is a
consequence of the previous work [9].
Load flow Without fluctuation With fluctuation
Shortest path Fragile Robust
Random walk Fragile Robust
that the overload probability Fu(k) is a decreasing func-
tion of k for any m. This implies that SF networks are
robust also against cascading overload failures induced
by fluctuating shortest-path flow. It is not surprising
that the degree dependences of FW0(k) and Fu(k) show
a similar tendency, because it has been reported that the
couplings between the fluctuations and the average of the
number of random walkers and the partial betweenness
centrality on individual nodes obeys the same scaling law
[16]. We can also consider a situation that cascading
failures are caused by non-fluctuating loads by random
walkers. In this case, an overload failure occurs when the
average number of walkers 〈w〉k = W0k/2M0 on a node
of degree k exceeds the node capacity depending on 〈w〉k,
where W0 is the total number of walkers and M0 is the
number of links in the initial network. Since 〈w〉k is pro-
portional to k and the degree of a node correlates closely
with the betweenness centrality of the node [41, 42], the
property of cascading failures induced by non-fluctuating
random walking loads is essentially the same as that by
loads of the betweenness centrality [9]. Therefore, SF
networks are fragile to such cascading failures. All the
above arguments can be summarized as shown in Table I.
From this Table, we can conclude that the robustness of
SF networks in our model is a consequence of the prop-
erty that failures are caused by extreme values of fluc-
tuating loads, but not concerned with the random walk
behavior of loads.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the robustness of scale-free (SF) net-
works against cascading overload failures induced by ex-
treme values of fluctuating loads that exceed the node
capacities. In our model, temporally fluctuating loads
are treated as random walkers on a network, for which
the stationary overload probability has been studied by
Kishore et al. [21]. At the first stage of the cascade, nodes
are removed from the initial network with this overload
probability, and the redistribution of loads in the dam-
aged network causes iteratively subsequent failures ac-
cording to the updated overload probability until no node
is expected to be removed. During the cascade process,
the total load is reduced in response to the decrease of the
number of links in the network under the cascade. How
quickly the total load is reduced is characterized by the
load reduction parameter r. The robustness of a network
is measured by the critical load reduction parameter rc
above which the relative size Sf of the giant component
at the final cascade stage is finite. We present a formu-
lation to calculate Sf by using the master equation for
the probability Πτ (k0, k) of a node in the network Gτ at
cascade step τ to have the present degree k and the ini-
tial degree k0 and by applying the generating function
method. Our results for SF networks with degree dis-
tribution P0(k) ∼ k
−γ at large k show that rc increases
with the exponent γ, which implies that SF networks are
robust against cascading overload failures in our model
as opposed to previous works [9–15]. The robustness of
SF networks is explained by the property of the overload
probability of being a decreasing function of the degree,
which is a consequence of the load fluctuations but not
concerned with the random walk behavior of loads.
In our model, the total load does not fluctuate through-
out the cascade process though the local load on a node
fluctuates. If the total load also fluctuates temporally
and the time scale of the fluctuation is faster than that
of the cascade process, the overload probability must be
different from Eq. (4) or (9). However, we can expect
that the overload probability remains to be a decreas-
ing function of the degree if the magnitude of the total
load fluctuation ∆W is much smaller than the average
total load 〈W 〉, which guarantees the robustness of SF
networks to cascading overload failures. This is because
the standard deviation σk of the fluctuating load w on a
node of degree k is proportional to the square root of the
average load 〈w〉k if ∆W ≪ 〈W 〉, as in the case of the
present work. It has, however, been reported that σk be-
comes proportional to 〈w〉k when ∆W/〈W 〉 approaches
to 1 [16]. The change in the property of the load fluc-
tuations may alter drastically the degree dependence of
the overload probability and hence the robustness of net-
works. It is thus important to study how robust SF net-
works are against cascading failures under large fluctua-
tions of the total load. Furthermore, although we present
the formulation to calculate the relative size of the giant
component Sf in this work, an analytical expression for
the critical load reduction parameter rc is not found. In
addition to solving this problem, the identification of the
universality class of the present model is also a subject
for future work.
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